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I. Introduction 
One of the most urgent, yet least discussed, dilemmas concerning the 
woman, the physician, and a host of others facing abortion today is access 
to the correct basic scientific information regarding the human embryo -
scientific information which demonstrates empirically that normally every 
human being begins at fertilization as a single-cell embryo, the zygote.[l] 
Without this correct scientific information we are all precluded from 
forming our consciences correctly[2J or making morally correct 
decisions[3] about abortion, human embryo research, human embryonic 
stem cell research, cloning, formation of interspecies chimeras, germ-line 
DNA recombinant gene research and therapy, and other related current 
medical and scientific issues.[4J The use of the correct science is indeed 
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the starting point for thinking about all of this, short of Divine 
Revelation.[S] 
II. Science and Philosophical Anthropology 
One philosopher's favorite dictum would seem quite appropriate here: 
"A small error in the beginning leads to a multitude of errors at the end" 
(paraphrased). [6] Nowhere is this more fundamental than here. Any error 
in the science will have a rippling effect on the philosophical 
anthropology[7], ethics[8], sociology, politics, law, and theology -
degrading our knowledge and understanding of the real dignity and status 
of the human embryo. To complicate the matter further, also facing us is 
the fact that the human embryo is per se a multi-faceted 'creature, and thus 
must be studied from the perspective of several different academic 
disciplines simultaneously.(9) Even one' s choice of philosophical schools 
to use (e.g., rationalist, empiricist, idealist, realist, existentialist, etc.) alone 
can be problematic, as each defines "being" differently (and therefore 
"human being" and "material being" differently)(lO) , and uses different 
starting points and criteria of truth - hence arriving at different conclusions 
about reality. This is not, however, to be taken as an excuse for claiming 
that we can never know "reality", that all philosophies are relative, or 
simply "different ways of looking at the same reality". Rather, it would be 
more to the point to say that some philosophies match reality and some 
don't; some philosophies are actually looking at quite different realities or 
cosmologies than others; and some philosophers are right and some 
philosophers are wrong - not a particularly "politically correct" statement, 
but true nonetheless. 
A realist philosopher' s starting point for doing philosophy at all is a 
posteriori (outside the mind), i.e., in our experiences of material things (or 
natural philosophy)(ll), rather than starting with purely subjective ideas in 
the mind. Thus all concepts are originally derived inductively, and must 
correspond with or match the material things outside our minds which 
caused those concepts in order to be judged as true. 
This is so as well for St. Thomas' philosophy (on whose holistic 
philosophical anthropology, among others, many of the Church's teachings 
and documents are philosophically based)(12), including his philosophical 
anthropology. For him a "human person" 'is defined as one single whole 
multi-faceted composite substance of three different principles or causes: 
immaterial fonn (the rational soul, which always contains virtually the 
sensitive and vegetative powers), "undesignated matter" (the human body), 
and esse (the act of existing of this one human substance).[13) The name 
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of "person", St. Thomas states, does not refer to the rational soul alone, nor 
to the whole soul alone, but to the entire subsistens - that is, the soul 
(form), body (matter), and act of existing (esse) all together as one whole 
existing human substance.[14) Thus the whole existing human substance is 
one person for St. Thomas - no splits, either within the soul itself, or 
between the whole soul and the body. Further, every human person is 
simultaneously a human being, and vice versa, since it is through the whole 
rational soul that a human body is specifically human, and animated (i .e., 
alive, existing). 
But because of its multi-faceted composition, in studying each one of 
these several facets of a human person it is necessary and essential to use 
the content of different academic "sciences" and therefore different 
epistemologies or methods, in the process. Thus the question as to when a 
human person begins is a philosophical (or using a different discipline, a 
theological) question - and a realist philosopher would begin by deriving 
his or her philosophical concept of "person" inductively from the correct 
natural philosophy, which in tum is derived from the correct basic sciences. 
The question as to when the physical material dimension of a human being 
begins is a strictly scientific question, and it is the basic science of human 
embryology which properly studies this question because it alone has the 
proper subject matter and epistemology to do so. 
Today, however, the very content or subject matter of the basic 
sciences has been corruptedl151, in tum leading to the use of the wrong 
epistemologies or methods, in tum leading to the wrong "scientific" 
conclusions about whether or not the human embryo or fetus are in fact 
human beings, and when these human beings begin their lives as individual 
persons. 
III. Science: The Formation of Conscience, and 
the Moral Decision Making Process. 
To know that the human embryo is indeed a personal human beingl6) 
is central to forming our consciences, and therefore to knowing what 
actions are right or wrong in a specific situation. While conscience is the 
subjective norm in philosophical natural law theory, it must be a correctly 
formed conscience - one in accord with objective reality and objective 
truthl17] - starting with and including this objective scientific truth . Thus 
any scientific error in this regard precludes us from forming our 
consciences correctly. 
An erroneous conscience literally enslaves us and erodes our 
freedom.118] Much of the error is usually referred to as "culpable" 
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ignorance - things we can do something about, and therefore for which we 
are responsible and accountable. But what I am pointing to is "inculpable" 
ignorance - things we really can' t do anything about - such as access to the 
correct basic scientific information about the human embryo in order to 
inform our consciences correctly 
The moral decision making process itself is also therefore corrupted. 
Although the moral and theological virtues are critical in the moral decision 
making process[19] , the intellectual virtues are the starting point for this 
process. [20] Yet they too seem to be frequently neglected in these 
discussions - especially the intellectual virtue of "science."[21] Given that 
it is the intellectual virtues which in general help us attain correct 
information as to what the good (end) is that we should desire, the 
intellectual virtue of scientia also helps us to think well, e.g., to know our 
reality correctly - including at least what the physical material dimension 
of a human embryo is and when it begins. Thus knowing that correct 
scientific information is part of the very starting point of the moral decision 
making process facing the mother, the physician and a multitude of others. 
This right starting point, in tum, is essential for then rightly deliberating 
about the means to our good (end), choosing those means, willing them, 
and performing such actions as are necessary to reach our proper human 
end or goal. So any scientific error in the beginning of this moral decision 
making process also precludes us from making morally correct decisions in 
the end. 
Even given the very best of scenarios, it is next to impossible these 
days for anyone to acquire the proper and correct basic scientific 
information about when the physical dimension of the human embryo or 
fetus begins - a situation due mostly to the inordinate influence of the 
scientific fraud so prominent in the secular bioethics[22] and related 
literatures - a real cacophony of chaos - which has been silently foisted 
upon the rest of us and now pervades our entire societies. And it is not just 
"the woman" who is a victim. 
IV. The Dilemma: To Abort or Not to Abort 
Consider the young teenagers or college students in today ' s society -
let's say they are all basically good and decent people - male and female-
and all come from loving, caring, practicing Catholic families. We'll call 
one of them Margaret. For whatever reason, Margaret suspects that she 
might be pregnant, and being the honest and diligent person that she is, she 
sincerely begins to try to inform her conscience so that she can make a 
morally right decision about whether or not to seek an abortion.[23] She 
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starts this process by seeking the advice of others whose knowledge and 
work she respects. 
Based on recent " scientific" articles and documentaries in the 
media[24), her parents are convinced that whatever is there is "just a bunch 
of loosely connected cells that don ' t know how many people they will be 
yet", so it is really "OK" and prudent to have an abortion. Her 
grandparents reluctantly concur, embarrassed that they are not up on the 
most recent, cutting edge scientific advancements which prove that it is just 
a "piece of the mother's tissues" . Her boy friend is convinced that it is just 
simply a "neutral blob". And her big sister teaches her that in terms of 
evolution it is probably still just a mouse, a fish , or a frog. Even her family 
lawyer assures her that it is just a piece of her own tissues, a part of her 
body, her own personal property that has "symbolic value" only[25) - and 
she reminds Margaret that abortion is legal now. The only viable issue left 
is "choice". 
The health clinic nurse in her high school instructs Margaret that 
pregnancy doesn ' t even begin until "conception", i.e., which takes place, 
she explains, when the "egg" implants into the uterus. [26] And if a 
condom was used she could not even get pregnant. Just to make sure, the 
nurse had slipped her a fresh supply of morning-after pills - for emergency 
use only, of course. Her local pharmacist assures her that morning-after 
pills are only contraceptive, and definitely never abortifacient - or so the 
pharmaceutical companies had assured him.(27] Even her sociology 
professor assures her that ridiculous claims that this could be a real human 
being are just remnants of a passe cultural or religious "belief system". 
In her high school library Margaret nervously scans the pages of the 
various medical textbooks, and the numerous pamphlets from Planned 
Parenthood - no sign anywhere that what she might be carrying now inside 
of her is a real human being yet. Same with the one medical textbook she 
grabbed from the shelf in the medical school library down the street.[28] 
She checks the internet and pulls up the web site for the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH), clicking into the page where information is provided to 
the researchers and the public about human embryonic stem cell research . 
There she finds the official testimony of the Director of NIH to the Un ited 
States Senate: these early "entities" are only totipotent stem celis, not a 
human being; a human being doesn ' t even exist until after birth and young 
adulthood. [29] The Senators and their staff race off to spread the good 
news to other Congressmen and their staffs, and even hold several press 
conferences to educate the public. 
Further checking at the Kennedy Institute of Bioethics Library at 
Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. - the only source of "ethical" 
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information feeding into the National Library of Medicine and NIH for 
researchers and interested others from around the world - confirms that not 
only is there no human being there, there is no human person there yet 
either. It is just a "potential person" - so all the bioethics and philosophy 
articles seemed to say. [30) "Phew - where are those pills?" Margaret 
sighs. Oh, no - they are all mixed up in her pocket now with the ones for 
sexually transmitted diseases (which she also recently contracted).[31) 
Margaret seeks the advice of her family physician, who quickly 
confirms to her all of the above.132) "Not to worry," he says to her, as he 
helps her sort out the pills. "That ' s all absolutely correct scientific 
information - the very latest from our professional medical associations! 
Besides," he smiles reassuringly, "these morning-after pills are essential 
for ' emergency contraception '. After all ," he reminds her, "you do want to 
be able to go on to college next fall , don ' t you? Trust me," he winks, as he 
urges her to quickly take those morning-after pills, before it is too late -
although she could still elect for an abortion if it is. 
The most comforting of all , as always, is her pastor. He assures her 
that there is nothing there but a "pre-embryo" I3-3) - hardly a human person 
with an immortal soul! " Right now all that is there is just a sort of 
' vegetable '," he explains to her. "The rational part of the soul can't be 
infused by God until the matter is 'appropriately organized' - about 14 
days after fertilization . After that, twinning cannot take place, so then God 
is sure, and finally agrees to slip the rational part of the soul right in there 
and create a real live human person. How else would theologians ever be 
certain about how many souls there were to baptize?" he quips. "Besides," 
he advises her, getting serious, "theologians tell us that only the cells from 
the inner layer of this ' pre-embryo-thing' become the later fetus and adult 
human being, not the cells from the outer cell layer. The cells from the 
outer cell layer are the ones that are all discarded after birth. That's why it 
is perfectly fine to use those morning-after pills," he assures her. "They 
would only attack the outer cell layer, not the inner cell layer from which 
the real human being will later arise. No," he concludes pensively, "a real 
person would not be so totally disconnected and confused. This ' pre-
embryo-thing' must just be sort of like a ' being-on-the-way' [34] - just a 
potential human person. So, Margaret, either the morning-after pills, or 
later even abortion, would be morally acceptable - given the proportionate 
circumstances and intentions, of course.[35) Thanks to modern science," 
her spiritual advisor advises, "we pastors can be much more pastoral these 
days. When is the Church ever going to get with?" he mumbles. "No guilt, 
my child. Go in peace." 
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Finally, assured by every kind of personal friend, family, and 
professional expert from whom she could possibly seek advice, Margaret is 
truly convinced that this "thing" inside of her is essentially insignificant 
and has no inherent or real value. The only "choice" left for her to make is 
whether she takes the morning-after pills now, or waits a while and gives 
her legal informed consent for an abortion. "How silly of me," she 
reproaches herself. "And to think, I had actually almost decided to call him 
Baby John!" The deed is done. No guilt.(36) 
v. Science and "Delayed Hominization" 
This scenario would be funny if it were not repeated a million times a 
week around the world. V irtually all of the basic "scientific" facts of 
human embryology provided to all of these victims are false. Contrary to 
reports in the media, and contrary to such "scientific" claims in the 
literatures of Planned Parenthood, the pharmaceutical industry, medical and 
research professional organizations, governmental institutions, bioethics 
textbooks and journals, laws,< regulations, international guidelines, and 
pastoral and theological "debates", the early human embryo is not "just a 
bunch of loosely connected and confused cells that don't know how many 
people they will be yet", "a neutral blob", "a piece of the mother' s tissues", 
a "seed on the way", a "fish on the way"137) - or a "pre-embryo". None of 
these claims have any basis in the objective scientific facts of human 
embryology. There is no such thing as a " pre-embryo", and the term itself 
is specifically rejected by human embryologists.[38) Furthermore, if 
fertilization has already taken place, the "morning-after" pill, or 
"emergency contraception", could possibly be abortifacient.[39) 
Every individual human being produced via normal sexual 
reproduction begins as a human embryo at fertilization(40] - when normal 
pregnancy actually begins[41) - or in in vitro fertilization, with the initial 
fusion of the sperm and oocyte. Thi s is not just a "faith position" , a 
"personal opinion" , or a "pro-life radical ' s" misguided fantasy. This is an 
objective scientific fact - Biology 101 - agreed to by every human 
embryologist around the world. Like 2 +2 = 4. 
At fertilization the matter is "appropriately organized"[42], and this 
single-cell human zygote - in vivo or in vitro - is an already existing 
human being[43), with his or her own unique genetic composition (from 
both the mother and the father), genetically already a girl or a boy.[44] 
Immediately this tiny human being directs his or her own growth and 
development.[45) The embryo grows continuously from a single-cell 
zygote, to the 12-16 cell morula stage, to the 5-6 day blastocyst stage, and 
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on. The whole embryonic blastocyst is the human embryo (the human 
being), not just the cells from the inner cell layer.[46] Specifically human 
proteins and enzymes are producedI47) , and later specifically human 
tissues and organs are formed - long before some isolated "pure rational 
soul" might be "infused" to try to direct such operations and functions . All 
biologists know empirically that function does follow being (or form).148] 
Therefore these specifically human functions and activities could only be 
produced by a human agent, a human being (i.e.), who must possess a 
human rational form - which form itself cannot be divided, or exist 
separately from the body). We also know empirically that carrot and frog 
enzymes, proteins, tissues and organs are not produced, and that carrots and 
frogs do not produce specifically human enzymes and proteins, organs and 
tissues! 
If there is a human being there, which the correct basic science surely 
demonstrates, we can reason directly from these correct objective scientific 
facts to the realist philosophical conclusion that there must be 
simultaneously a human person present as well - whole soul, body and esse 
in ONE single composite human being. There is no such thing as a pure 
"rational soul" alone; the rational soul must always contain virtually the 
sensitive and vegetative powers, and must always exist in one composite 
with the material body. If the vegetative powers are empirically 
observable, which they are, then the sensitive and rational powers must also 
be present as we11.149) 
Probably the most influential argument for "delayed personhood" has 
been the "individuality" argument of McCormick and Grobstein that 
grounds their concept of a "pre-embryo". 150] There may be a human being 
present at fertilization , they claim, but it is just a "genetic" individual, not a 
"developmentaf' individual, i.e. , a person. Only a "developmental" 
individual can be a person, i.e., when the rational soul can then be infused. 
They base this "developmental individuality" claim on their following 
interpretation of "human embryology" : These early entities, they claim, are 
just a "loose collection of cells" which "have not yet made up their minds 
as to how many individuals they will become". There are two essentially 
independent and separate layers in the blastocyst , they state, but only the 
inner cell layer (embryoblast) is the source of cells for the real future fetus 
and future adult human being. The cells of the outer cell layer 
(trophoblast) are the only ones discarded after birth as the placenta, etc., 
and none of these cells ever become part of the future embryo or fetus, etc. 
Also, twinning can still take place before 14 days, producing more than one 
individual. So there is no developmental individual there yet - which 
means that there is no human person there yet. At 14 days the primitive 
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streak begins to fonn and twinning cannot take place any more. It is only 
then that there is finally a "developmentaf' individual present, and 
therefore a person there, So for McConnick and Grobstein, the developing 
human embryo up to the 14-day biological marker is not a person yet, but 
instead is a "pre-embryo". 
In sum, the "pre-embryo" is "human", and a genetic individual, so 
therefore it deserves "respect". But the "pre-embryo" is not a 
developmental individual yet, and therefore not a human person yet - it is 
just a ''potential person". So it does not deserve the same respect as that 
due a real human person. Therefore it can be used in experimental human 
embryo research, cloning, some abortifacients are allowed, etc. - for 
"proportionate reasons", of course. 
However, this "human embryology" is erroneous and seriously 
misconstrued. No human embryologist would agree with such an 
interpretation. For example, the cells of the early human embryo are not so 
"loosely connected", but in fact are biologically all part of one and the very 
same whole individual human organism. Nor are they so psychologically 
"confused" and "undecided". And to cast the early blastocyst as essentially 
consisting of two separate, disconnected and isolated cell layers is 
empirically incorrect. There is constant and continuous interaction 
between and among the cells and tissues of the developing human being at 
anyone time right from the beginning.ISIJ Nor is it true that only the cells 
from the outer cell layer of the blastocyst are discarded after birth. Many 
of the tissues discarded after birth are derived from the inner embryoblast 
cell layer.[S2] And cells from the outer trophoblast cell layer do become 
part of the embryo (e.g. , the blood cells derived from the chorion, which 
originates from the outer trophoblast layer of the blastocyst). Nor are the 
cells of these two layers necessari Iy naturally "fated" to be one kind of cell 
or another. [S3] Furthermore, the dramatic experiments with Dolly the 
sheep, and those using adult stem cells in both medical research and 
therapy (including humans) have clearly demonstrated that the "fate" of 
any cell in the human body is capable of being artificially diverted, 
converted, and "deprogrammed" back to even the single-cell embryonic 
zygote stage. As reported in a recent article on adult stem cell research 
using mice: 
In a bizarre experiment that demonstrates the surprising plasticity 
of the body's cells, scientists have converted mice's brain cells into 
blood cells .. . IUlntil now, the stem cells were thought to be committed 
to their own organ type and unable to cross over ... A team of Italian and 
Canadian scientists, led by Angelo L. Vescovi ... in Milan, has now 
found that the neural stem cells can metamorphose into the blood-
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making stem cells of the bone marrow ... The conversion of neural stem 
cells into blood cells is particularly surprising because brain and blood 
come from different germ layers created in the early embryo .. . The 
brain develops from the ectoderm and blood from the mesoderm. Dr. 
Vescovi ' s work defies the widely held assumption that cells in the three 
lineages are permanently committed to their fate ... Dr. McKay said the 
new result showed that differentiation, the commitment of a cell to a 
specific fate , is not irreversible.1541 
These startling current experiments continue to be rapidly reported, and 
surely cast profound doubt on any further claims such as McCormick ' s and 
Grobstein ' s that the two cell layers of the blastocyst are so " isolated" and 
so permanently " fated" [55[ - either naturally or artificially. 
Furthermore, twinning can take place after /4 days and the formation 
of the primitive streak, [56[ as in Siamese twins and in fetus-in-fetu twins 
(which can form many weeks, indeed months, after the l4-day marker). 
And about one third of monozygotic twins are formed before the l4-day 
marker.[57[ Would they not be persons - then, or now? No need to 
baptize them either? And what about twins who form after the l4-day 
marker - are they also not persons either? 
Why the phenomenon of " twinning" has taken on such gargantuan 
proportions is surely an enigma - especially among scientists. The 
response in biological terms is rather simple. In monozygotic twinning, the 
first twin begins to exist at normal sexual fertilization - in vivo or in vitro. 
Since the twinning process itself is an asexual process of reproduction, the 
second twin begins to exist at fission , when the cells of the original embryo 
are split off - naturally or mechanically. Because the cells of this early 
embryo are "totipotent", the embryo has a built-in mechanism of repair and 
survival in the event of such injury. Thus under normal conditions, the first 
"twin" begins at fertilization as a human being (human person). It is really 
no more complicated than that.[58[ 
If McCormick and Grobstein (and all those who follow them) ground 
their "philosophical" (or theological) concept of " pre-embryo" on so much 
erroneous "human embryology", then the very concept of the "pre-embryo" 
itself is rendered completely and totally invalid - as well as their 
justification for using live human embryos in any experimental research. 
I would seriously suggest that in these arguments of McCormick and 
Grobstein - as well as in all of the other arguments for "delayed 
personhood" - certain kinds of philosophical, theological or political 
concepts have simply been imposed on the empirical human embryological 
data, and if the data don't fit these preconceived concepts, then the 
empirical data are simply changed and manipulated accordingly. 
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Considering the evidence, it would seem that a lot of documents, 
regulations, laws, professional codes, pharmaceutical licenses, national and 
international guidelines, standard medical treatments, fVF procedures and 
patient information literatures, pastoral directives, and bioethics textbooks 
and journals need to be cleaned up! And it also looks like the Church is 
with it! 
VI. Conclusion 
If we, as individuals in our personal lives, and as experts in our 
various professional fields, are so systematically precluded from knowing 
correctly these basic human embryological facts, this surely renders us 
schizophrenic between our lived experiences and our abilities to think and 
act well. The basic objective scientific truth is that these tiny vulnerable 
helpless defenseless human embryos are indeed real live human beings, and 
therefore real live human persons. 
Without knowledge of this objective truth, how can we possibly form 
our consciences correctly or make good moral decisions in the face of 
abortion or human embryo research? How are advisors to counsel and 
minister to us truthfully and objectively? How are we to make, or help 
others make, these very complex and difficult choices? How can societies 
come to grips with this simple objective reality, or legal systems interpret 
the "common good" correctly,(59) or vigorously protect all of its citizens? 
How are we to recognize this tiny human being as our neighbor - someone 
to love not just for his or her own sake, but also for the sake of God - Who 
Himself created this tiny child in His own image and likeness, from which 
comes this child 's true dignity and status?(60] He has commanded us to 
"choose life". But how are we to usher in the "culture of life", when we 
cannot even define "human life" correctly ourselves, and therefore know 
how to think and act correctly towards this life? We have ample historical 
examples of the kinds of devastations that flow from the deconstructions 
and re-definitions of vulnerable "human beings" - deceiving us with an 
arbitrary and fabricated two-tier caste of humanity to be eagerly relished as 
"objectively true" .(61] 
Nowhere is the need to evangelize greater in our contemporary 
technological society than in the basic sciences - not only for the personal 
conversions of these scientists, but also to appeal to them to at least remain 
intellectually honest in their chosen fields of science, regardless of outside 
political or economic pressures.(62) 
Margaret, her parents and grandparents, her sister, her boy friend, 
media professionals of all types, physicians, nurses, all health care workers, 
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phannacists - teachers and professors in the lower schools, high schools, 
colleges, graduate, medical, nursing and dental schools - social workers 
and sociologists, lawyers, judges, public policy makers, Congressmen, 
institution leaders, librarians, bioethicists, philosophers, parish priests, 
nuns, theologians, - and even other bench researchers in the same or 
different fields of science - all depend on their intellectual honesty. So 
does Baby John. A small error in the beginning has certainly led to a 
multitude of errors in the end. 
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on Procured A bortion (November 18, 1974). 
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24. See e.g., C. WARD KISCHER, " The big lie in human embryology: The case of 
the preembryo ", "The media and human embryology", and "Quid sit veritas? The 
reodyssey of one human embryologist as a modern Diogenes", in Kischer and 
Irving (eds.), The Human Development Hoax: Time to Tell The Truth ", distributed 
by the American Life League 1997, pp. 71-81 , 89-98, and 99-124. 
25 . Bioethics pervades most academic fields by now, including the law, where legal 
arguments, based essentially on "delayed personhood" premises, have been 
constructed and successfully set legal precedents. See, e.g., the "pre-embry" 
arguments by JOHN A. ROBERTSON (found in note 22, supra), which have been 
used in a number of frozen embryo legal cases. See also: JOHN A. ROBERTSON, 
"What we may do with preembryos: A response to Richard A. McCormick", 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1991 , I :4:293-302; ibid., "The case of the 
switched embryos ", The Hastings Center Report 1995, 25 :6: 13-24; ibid., 
"Symbolic issues in embryo research", The Hastings Center Report 1995, Jan./Feb. 
37-38. Robertson represented the father in the Tennessee frozen embryo case, and 
referred to these human embryos as "pre-embryos", quoting extensively from 
Clifford Grobstein 's "human embryology". The lower court found with 
internationally renowned Dr. Jerome Lejeune ' s scientific testimony, and concluded 
that there was no such thing as a "pre-embryo" [see lower court testimony of 
Lejeune in Davis v. Davis, Tennessee Court of Appeals at Knoxville, No. 190, slip 
op. at 5-6 (Sept. 13, 1990)] . However, on appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, 
the judge held that Lejeune 's testimony "revealed a profound confusion between 
science and religion" [Sec. 34, fint. 12], accepted the "pre-embryo" arguments of 
Robertson, and reversed the lower court ruling [842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)]. 
Interestingly, the judge also stated: "Left undisturbed, the trial court's ruling would 
have afforded preembryos the legal status of ' persons' and vested them with legally 
cognizable interests separate from those of their progenitors . Such a decision 
would doubtless have had the effect of outlawing JVF programs in the state of 
Tennessee" (emphasis mine). 
For other court cases in which the "pre-embryo" argument has succeeded, see, 
e.g., Kass v. Kass, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350, 91 N .Y.2d 554 (1998), in which the embryos 
were actually referred to as "pre-zygotes"; A. Z. v. B.Z., a Massachusetts frozen 
embryo case on appeal now to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts; 1. B. v. 
M.B. on appeal now to the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division 
(Docket No. A-1544-98 T3). Of course, Roe v. Wade [410 U.S. 113 (1973)] 
referred several times to the fetus as a "potential human being" and as a "potential 
human person" - another form of a "delayed personhood" argument. In Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 ( 1989), Justice O'Connor argued that 
viability was "far removed, both qualitatively and quantitatively, from that of the 
four-to eight-cell preembryos in this case." [ftnt. 17]. 
See also similar reasoning for "delayed personhood" in the work of: PASCAL 
KASIMBA, "Regulating IVF human embryo experimentation: The search for a 
legal basis ", Australian Law Journal 1988, 62 : 128-138; B. GAZE and KAREN 
DA WSON, " Who is the subject of IVF research? ", Bioethics 1989, vol 3; MAX 
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CHARLESWORTH, "Community control of IVF and embryo experimentation", in 
Peter Singer et aI, Embryo Experimentation, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990, pp. 147-152; BETH GAZE and PASCAL KASIMBA, "Embryo 
experimentation: The path and problems of legislation in Victoria", in Peter Singer 
et aI, Embryo Experimentation 1990, pp. 202-212; R.M. HARE, "Public policy in a 
pluralist society", in Peter Singer et aI, Embryo Experimentation 1990, pp. 183-
194. For arguments counter to these legal precedents, see, e.g., my two amicus 
curiae briefs on "fetal personhood" submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court, note 4, 
supra. 
26. These are claims stated by many proponents of "emergency contraception", e.g., 
by Janet Benshoof, President, The Center for Reproductive Law and Public Policy 
(New York), when I debated her on T.V. (Cable Network New York, "News Talk 
Television", July 2, 1996; also CBS News, "Up to the Minute", July I, 1996). 
Several groups and organizations are defining "pregnancy" as beginning at 
implantation (6-7 days after fertilization), and hence now even defining 
"conception" at implantation as well, e.g., The American Fertility Society, The 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists . Even the federal regulations 
for the use of human subjects in research define "pregnancy" as beginning at 
implantation (1991 OPRR Reports, u. s. Code of Federal Regulations: Protection 
of Human Subjects 45 CFR 46, pp. I 1-12). These federal regulations also 
erroneously defme "fetus" as beginning at implantation; however the fetal stage 
does not even begin until the end of the 8th week post fertilization . 
27. According to the web site for "Preven", "They [the ' emergency contraception' 
pills] may also act by altering tubal transport of sperm and/or ova (thereby 
inhibiting fertilization), and/or possibly altering the endometrium, (thereby 
inhibiting implantation) [http://www.preven.comJproductl02-06.html] . Again, 
" .. . they may produce changes in the lining of the uterus that could prevent 
implantation of a fertilized egg" [http://www.preven/comJproductl02-01 .html]. 
Searle pharmaceutical company communicated to me via their "senior scientist" 
that they, like all the American pharmaceutical companies, claim that the "morning-
after pill" could not possibly be abortifacient since there is only a "pre-embryo" 
there - and they base this "science" on the book by Australian theologian, Fr. 
Norman Ford, When Did I Begin?, (which I addressed in my dissertation, note I, 
supra; also see note 22, supra) (Personal communication, April 30, 1996 and 
August 30, 1996). Ford explicitly bases his own argument on the "human 
embryology" of McCormick and Grobstein. 
28. Medical texts are not necessarily as accurate as the basic science texts. It is the 
basic scientists' confirmed and detailed scientific work which is in turn used in 
medical texts by physicians, etc., often with watered-down and thus inaccurate 
definitions and unfounded claims. All basic human embryology textbooks state 
clearly that the human being or embryo begins at fertilization (or fission , etc., using 
different processes). However, one exception is the 5th edition of Keith Moore' s 
popular human embryology textbook, The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented 
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Embryology (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1993). In this edition Moore 
used the scientifically invalid term "pre-embryo" for the frrst time (and there were 
other very extensive scientific contradictions and irregularities in this edition as 
well). When confronted independently and vigorously by both Kischer and by 
myself with the fact that scientifically there is no such thing as a "pre-embryo", 
Moore fmally agreed, and removed the term from his 6th edition (1998). It is 
important that the proper edition of his text be used. At this time only the corrected 
6th edition of his textbook is accurate enough. For my comparative analysis of 
Moore's 3rd and 5th editions, see: D. IRVING, " 'New Age ' human embryology 
text books: 'Pre-embryo ', 'pregnancy ', and abortion counseling: Implications for 
fetal research", Linacre Quarterly 1994, 61 :42-62. 
29. HAROLD V ARMUS, "The Director's Congressional testimony on Stem Cell 
Research" (found at http://www.nih.gov/news/stemceI1lstatement.htm); see also, "A 
Primer for Stem Cell Research" [http://www.nih.gov/news/stemceI1lprimer.htm]. 
For a response to these official statements of the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), see D. IRVING, "Human embryonic stem cell research: Are official 
positions based on scientific fraud?", Communique (American Life League), July 
24,1999. 
The issue here is how "scientific" terms referring to the early human embryo 
are misused - what do they signify, what policy agendas do they advance? Often 
these terms are used to mean that the early human embryo is not a human being or 
not a human person yet - and therefore they may ethically be used in destructive 
experimental research. NIH has adopted this type of erroneous defmition of the 
early human embryo since at least 1979, when the term "pre-implantation embryo" 
was used by RICHARD MCCORMICK and CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN in the then-
HEW Ethics Advisory Board meetings [Report and Conclusions: HEW Support of 
Research Involving Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 
Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Health Education and Welfare, p. 
101]. The similar term "pre-embryo" was possibly coined about the same time by 
CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN ["External human fertilization"] Scientific American 
1979,240:57-67]. 
Subsequently the term "pre-embryo" has been used specifically - or by 
implication, by using the same erroneous "human embryology" used originaJly to 
justify that term - as normative in decades of bioethics articles and books (see note 
22, supra), population control, public policy, philosophical and theological 
literatures, and many national and international medical and research documents, 
e.g.: the American Fertility Society, "Ethical considerations of the new 
reproductive technologies ", Fertility and Sterility (Supplement I) 1986, 46:27S; 
British Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG), Report of the 
RCOG Ethics Committee on in Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Replacement or 
Transfer 1983, London: RCOG; Canadian Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies 1993, Canada; DAME MARY WARNOCK, Report of 
the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology, 1984, London: 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, pp. 27, 63; National Institutes of Health: Report 
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of the Human Embryo Research Panel 1994, Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, esp. pp. 48-51 . 
It is interesting that the only major references given in the NIH Human 
Embryo Research Panel Report (1994) to ground their conclusion that the early 
human embryo has only a "reduced moral status" were those citing the works of 
McCormick and Grobstein (Sister Carol Tauer, co-chair of the Panel's ethics 
committee, did her dissertation on fetal personhood under McCormick), and of 
Australians Norman Ford, Peter Singer, Karen Dawson, Stephen Buckle, and D. 
Wells (Report, p. 49) (see note 22, supra). Also, the NIH Panel's Report included 
an appendix with a scientific chart of human embryological terms, referenced only 
by one bioethics book written by these Australian bioethicists [PETER SINGER., 
HELGA KUHSE, STEPHEN BUCKLE, KAREN DA WSON, PASCAL 
KASIMBA, Embryo Experimentation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990]. For an analysis of this NIH Panel and its report, see D. IRVING, "NIH and 
human embryo research revisited: What is wrong with this picture?", in KISCHER 
AND IRVING (eds.), The Human Development Hoax: Time To Tell The Truth!", 
1997, pp. 267-282. 
30. See, e.g., note 22, supra. 
31. Scar tissue formed from abortions and sexually transmitted diseases is one of 
the major causes of infertility in young women today, and therefore one of the 
major reasons for the need for in vitro fertilization (lVF). See: "The 1998 
Guidelines for the Treatment of Sexually Transmitted Diseases ", The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, Division of STD Prevention, National Center For 
HIV, STD, and TB Prevention, Atlanta, GA. 
32. Note the use of the term "pre-embryo", and the redefinition of "pregnancy" as 
beginning at implantation (6-7 days) by the major medical professional societies, 
e.g., The American Fertility Society, The American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, etc. See also notes 26 and 29, supra. 
33 . See specifically, RICHARD MCCORMICK, "Who or what is the 
'preembryo '?", Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1991 , I : I :3-15; CLIFFORD 
GROBSTEIN, " The early development of human embryos", Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 1985, 10:213-236; see also other Catholic secular bioethics writers, 
note 22, supra. 
34. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. WALLACE, "Nature and human nature as the norm in 
medical ethics", in EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO, JOHN P, LANGAN and JOHN 
COLLINS HARVEY (eds.), Catholic Perspectives on Medical Morals, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1989, pp. 23-53 . 
35. For discussions about applying "proportional ism" to some of these issues, . see: 
EDWARD COLLINS V ACIK, "Catholic 'natural law ' and reproductive ethics ", 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1992, 17:329-346; JAMES L. WALSH and 
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MOIRA M. MCQUEEN, "The morality of induced delivery of the anencephalic 
fetus prior to viability", Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1993, 3:4:357-369. 
But see JOHN PAUL II, enc. Veritatis Splendor, 3.65-68; 4.73-78; JOHN PAUL II, 
encl Evangelium Vitae, 1.20. 
36. See JOSEPH CARDINAL RA TZINGER, Conscience and Truth, Braintree, 
MA: The Pope John Paul XXIII Medical-Moral Research and Education Center, 
1991, esp. pp. 4-5. . 
37. To quote from Ronan O'Rahilly and Muller: "The theory that successive stages 
of individual development (ontogeny) correspond with ("recapitulate") successive 
adult ancestors in the line of evolutionary descent (phylogeny) became popular in 
the 19th century as the so-called biogenetic law. This theory of recapitulation, 
however, has had a 'regrettable influence on the progress of embryology' [citing de 
Beer]. .. Furthermore, during its development an animal departs more and more from 
the form of other animals. Indeed, the early stages in the development of an animal 
are not like the adult stages of other forms, but resemble only the early stages of 
those animals." [See O'RAHILL Y AND MULLER, Human Embryology & 
Teratology, New York: Wiley-Liss, 1994, pp. 8-9.] 
38. See, RONAN O'RAHILLY AND FABIOLA MULLER, 1994: "The ill-defined 
and inaccurate term pre-embryo, which includes the embryonic disc, is said either 
to end with the appearance of the primitive streak or . .. to include neurulation. The 
term is not used in this book." (p. 55). (emphases mine). 
39. KEITH MOORE and T.V.N. PERSAUD, The Developing Human: Clinically 
Oriented Embryology (6th eds.), Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1998: 
"Inhibition of Implantation: The administration of relatively large doses of 
estrogens ("morning-after pills") for several days, beginning shortly after 
unprotected sexual intercourse, usually does not prevent fertilization but often 
prevents implantation of the blastocyst. Diethylstilbestrol, given daily in high 
dosage for 5 to 6 days, may also accelerate passage of the dividing zygote along the 
uterine tube (Kalant, et aI. , 1990). Normally, the endometrium progresses to the 
secretory phase of the menstrual cycle as the zygote forms, undergoes cleavage, and 
enters the uterus. The large amount of estrogen disturbs the normal balance 
between estrogen and progesterone that is necessary for preparation of the 
endometrium for implantation of the blastocyst. Postconception administration of 
hormones to prevent implantation of the blastocyst is sometimes used in cases of 
sexual assault or leakage of a condom, but this treatment is contraindicated for 
routine contraceptive use. The 'abortion pill ' RU-486 also destroys the conceptus 
by interrupting implantation because of interference with the hormonal 
environment of the implanting embryo. 
"An intrauterine device (IUD) inserted into the uterus through the vagina and 
cervix usually interferes with implantation by causing a local inflammatory 
reaction. Some IUDs contain progesterone that is slowly released and interferes 
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with the development of the endometrium so that implantation does not usually 
occur." (p. 58) 
" .. . [Question 2-5 for students] : A young woman who feared that she might be 
pregnant asked you about the so-called 'morning after pills' (postcoital birth 
control pills). What would you tell her? Would termination of such an early 
pregnancy be considered an abortion?" (p. 45) .. . [Answer #5 for students]: "#5 . 
Postcoital birth control pills ('morning after pills') may be prescribed in an 
emergency (e.g., following sexual abuse). Ovarian honnones (estrogen) taken in 
large doses within 72 hours after sexual intercourse usually prevent implantation of 
the blastocyst, probably by altering tubal motility, interfering with corpus luteum 
function, or causing abnonnal changes in the endometrium. These hormones 
prevent implantation, not fertilization. Consequently, they should not be called 
contraceptive pills. Conception occurs but the blastocyst does not implant. It 
would be more appropriate to call them 'contra implantation pills '. Because the 
term 'abortion ' refers to a premature stoppage of a pregnancy, the term 'abortion' 
could be applied to such an early termination of pregnancy." (p. 532) 
"[Question 3-2 for students]: A woman who was sexually assaulted during her 
fertile period was given large doses of estrogen [i.e., as in the morning-after pill] 
twice daily for five days to interrupt a possible pregnancy. If fertilization had 
occurred, what do you think would be the mechanism of action of this honnone? 
What do lay people call this type of medical treatment? Is this what the media refer 
to as the 'abortion pill'? If not, explain the method of action of the honnonal 
treatment. How early can a pregnancy be detected?" (p. 59) .. . [Answer 3-2 for 
students:]: "Diethylstilbestrol (DES) appears to affect the endometrium by 
rendering it unprepared for implantation, a process that is regulated by a delicate 
balance between estrogen and progesterone. The large doses of estrogen upset this 
balance. Progesterone makes the endometrium grow thick and succulent so that the 
blastocyst may become embedded and nourished adequately. DES pills are referred 
to as 'morning after pills' by lay people. When the media refer to the 'abortion 
pill' , they are usually referring to RU-486. This drug, developed in France, 
interferes with implantation of the blastocyst by blocking the production of 
progesterone by the corpus luteum. A pregnancy can be detected at the end of the 
second week after fertilization using highly sensitive pregnancy tests. Most tests 
depend on the presence of an early pregnancy factor (EPF) in the maternal serum. 
Early pregnancy can also be detected by ultrasonography." (p. 532) 
40. KEITH MOORE AND T.V.N. PERSAUD, The Developing Human: Clinically 
Oriented Embryology (6th ed.), Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1998: 
"Human development is a continuous process that begins when an oocyte (ovum) 
from a female is fertilized by a spenn (or spennatozoon) from a male. (p. 2); 
ibid.: .. . but the embryo begins to develop as soon as the oocyte isfertilized. (p. 2); 
ibid.: Zygote: this cell results from the union of an oocyte and a spenn. A zygote is 
the beginning of a new human being (i.e., an embryo). (p. 2) [Note the use of the 
tenn "being" here. Thus, this tenn is not restricted to philosophical or religious 
discussions only as some have argued, but is also used commonly in scientific 
discussions as well - as demonstrated here in this human embryology textbook]; 
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ibid.: Human development begins at fertilization, the process during which a male 
gamete or sperm ... unites with a female gamete or oocyte ... to form a single cell 
called a zygote. This highly specialized, totipotent cell marks the beginning of each 
of us as a unique individual." (p. 18). (emphases mine); BRUCE M. CARLSON, 
Human Embryology and Developmental Biology, St. Louis, MO: Mosby 1994: 
" ... fmaIly, the fertilized egg, now properly called an embryo, must make its way 
into the uterus .. . " (p.3). (emphases mine); WILLIAM J. LARSEN, Human 
Embryology, 1997: "In this text, we begin our description of the developing human 
with the formation and differentiation of the male and female sex cells or gametes, 
which will unite at fertilization to initiate the embryonic development of a new 
individual ... Fertilization takes place in the oviduct .. . resulting in the formation of 
a zygote containing a single diploid nucleus. Embryonic development is considered 
to begin at this point. (p.I); ibid.: This moment of zygote formation may be taken as 
the beginning or zero time point of embryonic developmen,t." (p. 17). (emphases 
mine); RONAN O' RAHILLY AND FABIOLA MULLER, Human Embryology & 
Teratology, New York: Wiley-Liss, 1994: "Fertilization is an important landmark 
because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism 
is thereby formed. (p. 5); ibid.: Fertilization is the procession of events that begins 
when a spermatozoon makes contact with a secondary oocyte or its 
investments .. . (p. 19); ibid. : The zygote ... is a unicellular embryo." (p. 19) 
(emphases mine). 
41 . CARLSON 1994: "Human pregnancy begins with the fusion of an egg and a 
spenn." (p. 3). (emphasis mine). 
42. As Klubertanz has expressed it, the human soul being a fonn, cannot be divided. 
The ovum and sperm unite, "thus giving rise to a single cell with the material 
disposition required for the presence of a soul"; (GEORGE KLUBERTANZ, The 
Philosophy of Nature, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953, p. 312); see 
also, D. IRVING, "Scientific and philosophical expertise: An evaluation of the 
argument on 'personhood' ", Linacre Quarterly 1993, 60:18-47, in C. WARD 
KISCHER and DIANNE N. IRVING (eds.), The Human Development Hoax: Time 
To Tell The Truth! ", 1997, p. 140, distributed by American Life League. 
43 . The realist philosophical concepts which best match this very dramatic physical 
change at fertilization, and the subsequent growth and development of the embryo 
and fetus, are "substantial change" and "accidental change". That is, one would say 
that before fertilization there are two gametes (the sperm and the oocyte), each of 
which have only 23 chromosomes, neither of which are human beings per se, but 
are only "parts" of human beings, and neither of which would grow if implanted 
singly in the womb. However, when these two gametes come together at 
fertilization and fuse, a totaIly different kind of thing comes into existence - i.e., a 
new unique individual human being, with 46 chromosomes (the normal number 
required for any individual of the human species). This would be an example of 
"substantial change" - i.e., a change in natures, or kinds of things. On the other 
hand, once this human being is formed, no further change in natures takes place. 
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. All that happens is simply that the already eXlstmg human being grows and 
develops bigger and bigger. This would be an example of "accidental change" -
i.e., simply a change in secondary properties of the very same individual human 
being. In fact, this is substantiated by empirical evidence. The same number (46) 
and quality of chromosomes exist in each and every cell of the new human being, 
regardless of which growth and developmental stage he or she is in. For 
explanations of these philosophical concepts of "substantial and accidental change", 
see: GEORGE KLUBERTANZ, The Philosophy of Human Nature, New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953, pp. 124ff; also KLUBERTANZ, The Philosophy 
of Being, ibid., pp. 98-100 (and THOMAS AQUINAS, Commentary on Aristotle 's 
Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, lect. 1 (ed.) Cathala, Nos. 1688-1689, as quoted p. 118); 
ARISTOTLE, Physica, 1.7.19Ia, 15-18, pp. 232-233; ibid., 2.3.194b, 23-35, pp. 
240-241. See also HENRY VEATCH, Aristotle: A Contemporary Approach, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1974, Chaps 2 and 3; D. IRVING, 
"Philosophical and scientific expertise .. . ", Linacre Quarterly 1993, 60: 18-47, in 
KISCHER AND IRVING (eds.), The Human Development Hoax ... 1997, p. 136. 
44. MOORE AND PERSAUD 1998: "The zygote is genetically unique because 
half of its chromosomes come from the mother and half from the father. The zygote 
contains a new combination of chromosomes that is different from that in the cells 
of either of the parents. This mechanism forms the basis of biparental inheritance 
and variation of the human species. Meiosis allows independent assortment of 
maternal and paternal chromosomes among the genn cells ... The embryo 's 
chromosomes sex is determined at fertilization by the kind of sperm (X or Y) that 
fertilizes the ovum: hence it is the father rather than the mother whose gamete 
detennines the sex of the embryo. (p. 37)." (emphases mine); CARLSON 1994: 
"The sex of the future embryo is determined by the chromosomal complement of the 
spermatozoon ... Through the mingling of maternal and paternal chromosomes, the 
zygote is a genetically unique product of chromosomal reassortment ... " (p. 31) 
(emphases mine). O'RAHILLY AND MULLER (1994): "Fertilization is an 
important landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically 
distinct human organism is thereby formed." (p.5) (emphases mine). 
45. The philosophical concept which matches this empirical reality is "potency". 
This is precisely the term which has been so misused and corrupted in many of the 
bioethics arguments for "delayed personhood", probably due to a lack of 
understanding of the correct historical origin and use of this very technical 
. philosophical term. - In these bioethics articles, the terms "potential human being" 
or "potential human person" are used to indicate a human being or human person 
who is not there yet, but who will begin to exist at some particular (arbitrary) 
biological or psychological marker later. (Sometimes the term "possible" human 
being is also used in the same sense). However, the term "potency" actually refers 
to a human being who already exists, e.g., the single-cell zygote at fertilization. By 
virtue of the kind of nature this already existing embryo possess (i.e., "human"), 
this embryo has the capacity or power or potency to express that human nature. The 
embryo also has the potential to grow bigger and bigger, to become an adult human 
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being, to play the violin, or to discover new scientific theories. Thus in this proper 
sense, the term "potentiar also refers to an already existing human being. (See 
same references for substantial and accidental change, note 43, supra; D. IRVING, 
"Philosophical and sCientific expertise ... " in KISCHER and IRVING (eds.), The 
Human Development Hoax ... , p. 137). 
46. Some try to argue that only the inner cell mass of the early 6-7 day blastocyst is 
the human embryo or human being, while the outer cell layer is not. (See, e.g., 
EDWARD J. FURTON and MICHELINE M. MATHEWS-ROTH, "Stem cell 
research and the human embryo ", Ethics and Medics 1999, 24:8, also posted on 
their web site: http://www.ethicsandmedics.comlspecials/stemcelll.htmI.My 
analysis of their article is available upon request.) Many confuse the terms 
"embryo" and "embryo proper", or are unaware of current research which refutes 
the dictum that cells are permanently "fated" (see notes 52-55, infra). 
Unfortunately, this erroneous "human embryology" has led others to then argue that 
the use of some abortifacients would therefore not constitute a direct abortion, 
because the chemical would only act on this outer cell layer, and not directly on the 
"real" human embryo (human being) which is constituted, they claim, only by the 
inner cell layer. (See these implications, e.g. , in ALBERT MORCZEWSKI, 
"Managing tubal pregnancies, Parts I and II", Ethics and ·Medics, June and August 
1996, 21 :6 and 21 :8. The correct human embryology is that the whole blastocyst is 
the human being, the human embryo, not just the inner cell layer of the blastocyst: 
CARLSON 1994: "About 4 days after fertilization, a fluid-filled space begins to 
form inside the embryo. The space is known as the blastocoele and the embryo as a 
whole is called a blastocyst." (p. 34) (emphases mine). O'RAHILLY AND 
MULLER: "During the frrst week the embryo becomes a solid mass of cells and 
then acquires a cavity, at which time it is known as a blastocyst." (p. 23) (emphases 
mine). 
47. This has been demonstrated by recent experiments using transgenic animals, 
e.g., G. KOLLIAS et aI, "The human beta-globulin gene contains a downstream 
developmental specific enhancer", Nucleic Acids Research 1987, 15:14:5739-47; 
R.K. HUMPHRIES et aI, "Transf er of human and murine globin-gene sequences 
into transgenic mice" , American Journal of Human Genetics 1985, 37:2:295-310; 
A. SCHNIEKE et aI, "Introduction of the human pro alpha 1 (1) collagen gene into 
pro alpha 1 (I)-deficient Mov-13 mouse cells leads to formation of functional 
mouse-human hybrid type 1 collagen", Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Science - USA 1987,84:3:764-768. 
48. BENJAMIN LEWIN (ed.), Genes III, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987, 
pp. 11-13, 17-19,30, 32, 33, 35, 79, 91 , 93-93 ; ALAN E.H. EMERY, Elements of 
Medical Genetics, New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1983, pp. 25, 34, 65, 10 1-
103. Indeed, there are usually sections on "form and function" at the end of each 
chapter in biology textbooks. One sometimes hears today the erroneous reversal of 
this phrase, i.e., "form follows function"; however even in "evolution" theory the 
changedform is the cause of the changedfunction. 
November, 2000 49 
49. See notes 13, 14,42,43 and 45, 47-48, supra. 
50. RICHARD MCCORMICK, "Who or what is the preembryo '?", Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics Journal 1991, I: I :3-15; CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN, "The early 
development of human embryos", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1985, 
10:213-236. 
5l.CARLSON (1994): "The transition from morula to blastocyst and the fonnation 
of a fluid-filled blastocoele depends first on the maintenance of 
intercommunications between superficial blastomeres via gap junctions. In the 
absence of gap junctions, embryos fail to cavitate (fonn a blastocoele). Cavitation 
involves the buildup of fluid within the blastoceole. Fluid accumulation is a 
function of a sodium transport system based on Na+, K + -ATPase that develops in 
the outer blastomeres. The net effect of this enzyme is the movement of Na+ and 
H20 across the blastomeres and the buildup of fluid in the spaces fonning among 
the inner blastomeres." (p. 34) (emphases mine); O'RAHILLY AND MULLER 
(1994): "Although the genn layers are no longer regarded as rigidly specific, each 
layer nonnally makes defmite contributions to the different tissues and organs ... 
Most organs, however, are formed from more than one germ layer, and, indeed, 
interactions between germ layers are necessary for successful morphogenesis." (p. 
79); ibid.: "The first overt indication of cellular differentiation in the embryo is the 
appearance of a polarized epithelium, namely the trophoblast. Reorganization of 
the cellular surface, cytocortex, and cytoplasm are thought to depend on the 
expression of proteins that mediate cell-cell and cell-substratum contact. Cell-cell 
interactions depend on cell adhesion molecules." (p. 80); ibid.: "The skin consists 
of epidennis and dennis '" As is common in many organs, epithelio-mesenchymal 
interaction is important." (p. 99) (emphases mine); LARSEN (1997): "During the 
second week, the extraembryonic mesoderm, ctyotrophoblast, and 
synctiotrophoblast begin to collaborate with the uterus to fonn the placenta." (p. 
33) (emphases mine); MOORE AND PERSAUD (1998): "This broad 
developmental potential becomes progressively restricted as tissues acquire the 
specialized features necessary for increasing their sophistication of structure and 
function. Such restriction presumes that choices must be made in order to achieve 
tissue diversification. At present, most evidence indicates that these choices are 
determined, not as a consequence of cell lineage, but rather, in response to cues 
from the immediate surroundings, including the adjacent tissues. As a result, the 
architectural precision and coordination that are often required for the nonnal 
function ofan organ appear to be achieved by the interaction of its constituent parts 
during development ... The interaction of tissues during development is a recurring 
theme in embryology (Guthrie, 1991). The interactions that lead to a change in the 
course of development of at least one of the interactants are tenned inductions ' " 
The fact that one tissue can influence the developmental pathway adopted by 
another tissue presumes that a signal passes between the two interactants. " (p. 89) 
(emphases mine). 
50 Linacre Quarterly 
52. MOORE AND PERSAUD (1998): "The chorion, ' amnion, yolk sac, and 
allantois constitute the/etal membranes. They develop from the zygote but do not 
participate in the fonnation of the embryo or fetus, except for parts of the yolk sac 
and allantois. Part of the yolk sac is incorporated into the embryo as the 
primordium of the gut. The allantois fonns a fibrous cord that is known as the 
urachus in the fetus and the median umbilical ligament in the adult. It extends from 
the apex of the urinary bladder to the umbilicus." (p. 131) (emphases mine); 
CARLSON (1994): "The tissues that make up the fetaVmaternal interface (placenta 
and chorion) are derivatives o/the trophoblast, which separates from the inner cell 
mass and surrounds the cellular precursors of the embryo proper even as the 
cleaving zygote travels down the uterine tube on its way to implanting into the 
uterine wall. Other extraemryonic tissues are derived from the inner cell mass. 
These include the amnion (an ectodennal derivative), which fonns a protective 
fluid-filled capsule around the embryo; the yolk sac (an endodennal derivative), 
which in mammalian embryos no longer serves a primary nutritive function; the 
allantois (an endometrial derivative), which is associated with the removal of 
embryonic wastes; and the extraembryonic mesoderm, which fonns the bulk of the 
umbilical cord, the connective tissue backing of the extraembryonic membranes, 
and the blood vessels that supply them." (p. 87) (emphases are mine) 
53 . This claim by McConnick and Grobstein is essentially stating that past a certain 
point in early human embryonic development, the cells of the developing embryo 
are pennanentIy "fated" to be only involved in the development of the placental 
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and "isolated". Nor is it so certain that the extraembryonic mesoderm derives from 
the embryo proper, but rather it derives partially from the cytotrophoblast, which 
itself originates from the outer trophoblast cell layer of the blastocyst. 
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